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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
qo.,

AMERICAN

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsUT AH FEATHERS, a division of
MILLER SKI COMPANY, a
corporation,

Case No.
12,852

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action, in contract, by a freight broker
against its principal, a shipper, for sums expended to
transport goods to European ports initiated when the
shipper refused to pay because the amount claimed far
exceeded the sum the shipper had authorized the broker
to expend.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded
judgment to the freight broker (Respondent, Ameri-
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can Express Compa11y) anrl against the shipper (Appellant, Utah
a division of l\liller Ski Company) in the principal sum of $4, 111.56, the full amount
claimed by the broker.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Utah Feathers seeks a reversal of that portion of
the trial court judgment which exceeds $1,534.35, the
sum American Express was authorized to expend.

STATEMENT 0-F FACTS
Appellant is a Utah corporation owned by Earl
l\liller and engaged in various types of manufacturing,
including processing and exporting of turkey feathers
( urnlcr the commercial names of Utah Feathers and
_Miller l\Iasterfletchcrs) to various European ports for
use as fletching on arrows (Transcript pages 5 and 52
antl Defendant's Exhibit No. 20). American Express,
among its other business acti,,ities, held itself out
be. and acted as a freight agent and custom house broker
licensed by the U. S. l\Iaritime Commission to represent shippers in moving their marchandise in interna·
f onal freight (Transcript pages 24 and 25 and Plain·
tiff's Exhibit No. 11). The transaction was entered
into through a series of letters between the parties by
which American Express agreed for compensation to
act as agent to represent Utah Feathers' interest in ar·
ranging transportation, customs clearance, insurance
and documentation for shipment of turkey feathers in
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hulk from San Francisco, California to European ports
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 20 and Plaintiff's Exhibits
:N" os. 11, 13 and 14.)
Utah "Feathers had for many years shipped f eathers in hulk across the United States by inland carriers
to Port of New York, and by steamship from there to
European ports (Transcript pages 52 and 53), but had
done so with the assistance of freight agents and customs brokers other than American Express. The carrier
charges customarily paid by Utah Feathers for shipments to European Ports immediately prior to the
transactions here involved had been $133.60 per metric
ton ( 22o0 lbs.) (Transcript page 56). It occurred to
Earl l\liller, president of Utah Feathers, that it might
be easier to ship from Port of San Francisco (Transcript page 52) and so he wrote a letter of inquiry to the
San lj""'rancisco office of American Express asking the
price for shipping feathers and the availability of space
on caniers (Defendant's Exhibit No. 20). Thereafter
an agreement was arranged by correspondence between
Earl :Miller, acting for Utah Feathers, and John James
Ewing, Export l\Ianager of American Express (Defendant's Exhibit No. 20 and Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos.
11, 13 and 14).
The negotiations were launched by a letter from
Earl
to American Express on August 20, 1968,
which stated as follows:
"Gentlemen:
Please quote us a price of shipping feath-
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ers compressed to 7 lbs. per cubic foot to
Liverpool, JI.ngland from the Port of San
Francisco.
Also, please advise us the schedule of
available space on .carriers during the next 45
days.
Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
:MILLER l\iASTERFLETCHERS
Isl Earl A. Miller
President"
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 20)
On August 26, 1968, _l\ir. Ewing answered for
American Express by letter as follows:
"Dear Sir,
Re your letter of the 20th August 1968.
'l'i1ere is know (sic) specific Hate Item for
}'cathers quoted in the Pacific Coast European
Conference Tariff. Cargo would go as Cargo
NOS. The Rate for Cargo NOS to Liverpool
lS;

NON CONFERENCE RATE
90.58 per 40 Cubic Feet or Two Thousand

Pouuds. OCEAN FREIGHT plus 3% of
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Total Freight 4.20 per 40 Cubic ·Feet or Two
Thousand Poun<ls San Francisco HAND LING Fees.
1.00 per 40 Cubic Feets (sic) or Two Thou-

sand Pounds San Francisco "\iVHARFAGE
Fees.
CONFERENCE RATE

77.00 per 40 Cubic Feet or Two Thousand

Pounds. OCEAN FREIGHT plus 3% of
Total Freight.
San Francisco Terminal Charges (Handling
and Wharfage same as for Non Conference).
As you can see, it will pay you, if you decide
to ship on a regular basis, to sign a Conference Agreement. All this means is that you
agree to only use Conference Vessels and The
Conference agree to always have a Vessel available. If after a time you ship sufficient
Freight you can apply to have a Specific
Rate for Feathers which would be less that
(sic) the NOS Rate.
American Express Charges would be $20.00
for Documentation plus $2.50 for Banking if
you would so wish us to handle your shipments. We can also arrange Insurance at a
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rate of .44!' per $100.00 coverage plus $2.50
Insurance Ilrokerage Fee.
There is approx one Vessel a week leaving the
San Francisco ]lay Area for Liverpool so
Space requirement is not difficult.
"If you have any more questions please write
to the undersigned and we will be please (sic)
to assist you.
Yours truly,

Isl J olm J. Ewing.
Export Division."
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11)

On August 30, 1968

1\1 iller responded set·
ting for th his understanding of the proposed term as
follows:
"Dear l\Ir. Ewing:
Thank you for your letter of August 26.
'"' e wish to sign an agreement to ship all
our feathers via Co11f erence vessels in the
per 2,000 pounds rate plus the other
charges \)f a% of the total freight, $4.20 per
2,000 pounds harnlling fees, and $1.00 for
2,000 pounds for wharfage fees.
Please advise to which dock we should deliver these feathers. They will be corning from
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various turkey plants throughout the United
States and should be ready for you to ship
within two weeks.
Sincerely yours,
MILLER MASTERFLETCHERS

Isl Earl A. Miller

President"

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13)
lVIr. Ewing then wrote on September 3, 1968 as
follows:
"Dear l\Ir. l\iiller,
Re your letter of the 30th August 1968,
'Ve (sic) will be very happy to assist you in
the exportation of your feathers. attached
(sic) please find two copies of Shippers Rate
Agreement, from the Pacific Cost (sic)
European
Please sign and return.
'Ve tried to phone you but according to the
Orem Operator there was no such Phone
Number please confirm that 801-FR- 3-6008
is correct. Before you can go ahead and deliver
your cargo we must know how much cargo you
will be shipping, so as we can book space with
a shipping company.
If you wish us to handle the Banking
please inform us. A few copies of our Export
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Shipping Insti-uction form are attched. If you
have any questions; please call us at the above
Phone Number.
Yours truly,

Isl John J. Ewing.

Export Division."
(Plaintiff's Exhibit :No. 14).

Th;s letter was accompanied by a contract form
called a Shippers Hate Agreement (Plaintiff's Ex·
hibit Xo. 12) of an organization of steamship carriers
called the Pacific Coast European Conference which
l\Ir. Ewing state<l in his letter and at the trial would
ship at lower rates for shippers that would agree to ship
all their merchandise by conference vessels rather than
non-conference vessels (Transcript page 28). The
Shippers Rate Agreement mailed to Utah Feathers did
not specify any rates but related only to the relati?n·
ship to be established between shipper and carrier. In
referring to rates it muely ref erred to existing con·
f ercnce tariffs and stated that a schedule of rates
would be arnilable at the conference and carriers of·
fices and that a shipper c<n1ld obtain the schedule liy
suhseription at a re<1sonably compensatory price (Plain·
tiff's Exhibit No. 12, paragraph 10). l\Ir. Ewing used
those schedules in quoting the rates but the onliy com·
munication to defendant specifying the rates was Mr.
Ewing's letter of August 26, 1968 (Plaintiff's Ex·
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hibit No. 11). At the trial Mr. Ewing explained that
he quoted the conference rate for feathers as cargo
N 0 S (not otherwise specified) because the conference
did not list fathers as a specific item in its rate schedule (Transcript page 28 and his letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11).
Although Mr. Miller's letter of August 30, 1968
stated that Utah Feathers wanted to sign an agreement
to "ship all our feathers via conference vessels in the
$77.00 per 2000 pounds rate plus the other charges of
3 % of the total freight, $4.20 per 2000 pounds handling
fees, and $1.00 for 2000 pounds for wharfage fees,"
the Shippers Rate Agreement was never executed
(Transcript pages 30, 64, 69 and 84).
On September 4, 1968 Miller mailed the following
letter to American Express:
"Dear Mr. Ewing:
To further classify our letter of August 30th
do not, under any circumstances, ship the
feathers to European ports if the rate exceeds
$77 .00 per 2000 lbs, plus the a% of total
freight, $4.20 per 2000 lbs handling fees, and
$1.00 for 2000 lbs wharfage fees.
The rate from the port of New York is $132.00
approximately for 2260 lbs (metric ton). Cost
from Utah and California to New York is
approximately $10.50 per hundred weight or
$210.00 per ton.
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Sincerely yours,
l\IILLER :MASTER:FLETCHERS

Isl Earl A. l\liller
President"
Mr . .Ewing testified that this letter was never received.
American Express received and shipped the feathers for Utah Feathers (Transcript pages 10 to 18) and
three or four months thereafter, when Utah Feathers
hacl not receive<l hills, l\I r. l\liller wrote requesting them.
"Then the invoices were fi1wJly forwarded to Utah
Feathers, they learned for the first time that American
Express had pai<l the shipping lines freight bills approximately ten times larger than the amount of the
quoted rate Utah Feathers had authorized American
Express to expend and far in excess of what it would
have cost if the shipments had gone through Port of
X cw York (Transcript pages 57, 59, 64, 65 and 74) .
.John :Ewing testified at the trial that the rates he
quoted in his letter of August 26, 1!)()8 "implied" that
the ship line, at its option, could charge either by weight
or by Yolume, arnl the <:arricr had applied the rate to
Yolume to their ad\'antag,e (Transcript page 44 and 26) ·
Earl .:\Iiller testif;ed that the quoted and agreed
rate was $77.00 per two thousand pounds plus the
charges for the services of American Express and that
his letter of August
IH68 specifically made his un-
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dcrstan<ling of that rate clear to plaintiff before the
shipments were made (Transcript pages 54, 55, 56 and

58).

'\Tith the rates an<l charges computed in accordance with Mr. Miller's letter of August 30, 1968,
American Express was not authorized to expend more
than $1,534.35 (Transcript page 74). They claimed to
have expended $4,111.56.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
IT ';y AS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL
COURT TO A'V"ARD JUDGMENT
FOR SUl\IS EXPENDED BY THE
AGENT BEYOND THE AMOUNT
AUTHORIZED BY THE PRINCIPAL.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
IT FAILED TO RULE THAT BECAUSE THE UTAH FEATHERS'
ANSWER TO THE Al\IERICAN EXPRESS OFFER VARIED THE PROPOSED TERM:S BY LIMITING THE
RATES TO :MEASURE BY WEIGHT
ONLY, IT CONSTITUTED A REJECTION OF THAT OFFER AND
THEREFORE A COUNTEROFFER.
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'VHEN Al\IERICAN EXPRESS PERFORl\IED TI-IE ACT O"F SHIPPING
THE GOODS TIIAT COUNTEROFFER SET THE Lll\11'1' OF THE
AGENT'S AUTI-IOlUTY.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COl\IMITTED
ERROR IN UASING ITS DECISION
UPON A DETERMINATION THAT
UTAH FEATHERS 'VAS CHARGEABLE 'VITH KNO,VLEDGE THAT
THE RATES QUOTED UY Al\iERICAN EXPRESS 'VERE MAJJE WITHIN TIIE CUSTOlVI AND USAGE OF
THE UUSINESS.
ARGU1\lENT

''r

POINT I

IT
AS ERROR
THE TRIAL
COURT TO A 'VARD .TUDGl\IENT
FOR SUMS EXPENDED BY THE
AGENT HEYOND THE AMOUNT
AUTHORIZED BY THE PRINCIPAL.
American Express Company acted as agent for
Utah Feathers in the transactions that are the subject
of this action. They were to be paid for services in arranging transportation of shipments of feathers from
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Port of San Francisco to European ports. By their
letterhead and hy the testimony of their export manager, American Express had held themselves out to be
licensed and ava;lable to act as a freight agent and
custom house broker to represent the iQterests of shippers in dealing with the complexities of export documentation and coordination and in moving merchandise
from inland carriers through customs and on board
ocean caITiers for transportation overseas. They classed
themselves as a "licensed international freight forwarder" (Transcript page 24) and agreed for a compensation to act for Utah }'eathers in making necessary arrangements for ocean transportation of feathers.
In assuming the responsibilities of an agent American Express established a fiduciary relationship knowing that Utah Feathers would repose trust and confidence in them to exercise loyalty and care toward their
affairs and to faithfully protect their interests. It is a
well recognized principal of agency law that:
"An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency."
Restatement, Agency (2nd Ed.) Section 13, and
" .... The fiduciary relationship existing between an agent and his principal has been compared to that which arises upon the creation of
a trust, and the rule requiring an agent to act
with the utmost good faith and loyalty toward his principal or employer applies regard-

14

less of whether the agency is one coupled with
an interest, or the compensation given the
agent is small or nominal, or that it is a gratuit ous agency ... "
3 Am . .Tur. 2d., Agency, Section 1!)9, pages 580 and
;'581, and Little t'S. 11 cr::Jingcr, 34 Utah 337, 97 P. 639.

It has also long been established as a general rule
of agency law that the agent owes to his principal the
use of such skill as may be required to accomplish the
object of his employment, and if he omits to evercise
reasonable care, di.ligence and judgment he may be responsible to the prineipa J for damages ( 3 .Am. J ur 2d
Agency, Section 202, page 583). Indeed, it has been
held that the law scrutinizes very closely all deali11gs between a prtncipal and agent in the subject matter of
the agency to see that the agent has given the principal
the benefit of all his knowledge and skill (Jfcrchant t 1S.
Porcman, 182 Kan. 550, 322 P. 2d 740; Shatz Realty

Com pan,11 t'S. King, 225 Ky. 846, 10 S.,V. 2d 4;56,. 6
A.L.R. 1H7 4).
'Vhere, as in this case, the agent holds himself out
as ha ,·ing
skills and talents in a certain field,
he assumes an obligation to exercise the care and skill
that characterizes that field and is therefore different in
kind from the diligence or capacity of the ordinary citizen ( Coom.<? vs. Beede, 80 .Me. 187, 36 A. 104; Isharn vs.
Post, 141 N".E. 100, 35 N.E. 1084; 3 Am. Jur. 2nd,
Agency, Section 205, page 585).
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Although the courts have generally held that where
an agent is employed or directecl by his principal to
do an act and he acts within the scope of his authority,
the law implies a promise to reimburse for necessary
expenses advanced or incurred by the agent in order to
consumate that which he is directed to do (Hoggan vs.
Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512; il Am. Jnr. 2nd, Agency, Section 243, page 612). Nevertheless, the rule is
well established that where the agent exceeds his authority he will not be permitted to recover from the principal for money advanced or liabilities incurred beyond the
limits of !1is authority ( 3 Am. J ur. 2nd, Agency, Section 244, page 613). The Restatement of Agency in describing this rule says:
"°"Then No Duty of Indeminity
Unless otherwise agreed, the principal is
not subject to a duty to indemnify an agent:
(a) for pecuniary loss or other harm, not
of benefit to the principal, arising from the
performance of unauthorized acts or resulting solely from the agent's negligence or
other fault ... "
(Restatement, Agency, 2nd Ed., Section 440).
And at page 335 under the comment on that section its states that:
". . . the principal has no duty to indemnify
the agent for unauthorized payments or for
losses resulting from unauthorized acts ... "
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This rule has been stated and applied in a federal court
as follows:
" ... [the] disbursements must be made, however, within the scope of the agent's authority,
and if money is paid out or a loss incurred
with respect to a matter as to which the agent
acted in excess of his authority or in violation
of his instructions, he is not entitled to reimbursement unless the principal ratifies his
acts."

In re American Range & Foundry Co., 14
at page 468.

2d 466

American Express held itself out as having special
skills as a freight or custom house broker and although
a broker is, broadly speaking, an agent, the agency of a
broker is distinguishable from general agencies in that
he is an irnlepernlent contractor and his authority is of
a special character specifically limited by the instructions given to him by his principal ( 12 Am. Jnr. 2nd,
Brokers, Section 2 and Section 3, pages 773 and 774).
l•'nrthermore, a broker cannot recover money which he
voluntarily advances in behalf of his employer without
heing expressly or impliedly requested to do so unless
his principal subsequently ratifies such unwarranted
action on his part (Delafield vs. S1mith, 101 \Vis. 664,
78 N.\V. 170; 12 Am. Jnr. 2nd, Brokers, Section 239,
page 981). Here there was no ratification. American
Express did not claim there was. In fact, Mr. :Miller
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protested the expenditures as soon as he learned of
them.
In the instant case the only source for authority
of American Express to expend sums on behalf of Utah
Feathers was Mr. Miller's letter of August 26, 1968
which expressly set forth the terms they would agree
to for the shipment of their feathers, namely:
" . . . $77.00 per 2,000 pounds rate plus the
other charges of 3 % of the total freight, $4.20
per 2,000 pounds handling fees, and $1.00 for
2,000 pounds for wharfage fees."

If, as claimed by American Express' Export l\1anager, his prior letter of August 20, 1968 impliedly
meant that the carrier had the option of charging the
$77.00 rate either by weight or by volume, whichever
became most advantageous to the carrier and that l\Ir.
l\Iiller of Utah Feathers should have read that meaning into it, then Mr. l\Iiller's answering letter setting
forth terms that contradicted l\Ir. Ewing's understanding of his quote surely should have constituted a "red
flag" waving in Mr. Ewing's face saying, "Watch
out! 1\1 ill er doesn't understand the quote you gave. He
only intends to pay $77.00 per 2,000 pounds without
modification for volume."
For Ewing to go forward and ship the feathers
without any further communication or clarification with
Mr. l\Iiller about the rates could only be a breach of the
good faith and loyalty required in the fiduciary rela-
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tionship of the agent arnl a violation of the obligation
of skill and diligence that should characterize a freight
forwarder and custom house broker who is paid to represent the interests of the shipper.
In order to determine the question of the scope of
authority of American Express to expend funds to ship
the Utah Feathers cargos the trial court had before
it only the following items relating thereto:
1.

l\Ir. Ewing's testimony.

2.

:l\Irs. :Mote's testimony.

3.

.Mr. l\liller's testimony.

4. .l\Ir. Ewing's letter of August 26, 1968 (Plain-

tiff's Exhibit No. 11).

5. l\Ir. :Miller's answering letter of August 30,
1968 (Plaintiff's Exhjbit No. 13).

The Shippers Rate Agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 12).
6.

7. l\Ir. l\Iiller's letter of September 4, 1968 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 21).
Examining the items in that order reveals that:
l\Ir. Ewing's testimony was that the entire
agreement as to rates was contained in the correspondence (Transcript page 39) . Although he ref erred to a
telephone conversation with .l\Irs. :l\Iote, a Utah Feathers employee on September 9, 1968 regarding coordinating of shipments and rates (Transcript page 38) there
1.
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was no testimony that the conversation in any way
expandecl or modified the limited authority granted by
Mr. l\Iiller's letter of August 30, 1968.
l\Irs. l\Iote stated that the conversation related
to destination of the feathers, that she did not recollect
having any conversaion regarding rates, that all communications regarding the rates were by letter and that
she had no authority to arrange rates because l\Ir. Milfel'
handled all that personally (Transcript pages 48, 49
and 50).
3. l\fr. :l\Iiller testified that the arrangements
were all done through the correspondence (Transcript
page 56).
4. l\Ir. Ewing's letter of August 26, 1968 is
ambiguous as to the rate quoted in that it stated "77.00
per 40 cubic feet or two thousand pounds." He testified
the letter "implied" an option on the part of the carrier
to charge by weight or by volume at its option.
2.

l\Ir..Miller's letter of August 30, 1968 on the
other hand, makes it clear that he only intended to pay
a rate of $77.00 per 2000 pounds plus the American
Express fees.
5.

The Shippers Rate Agreement did not in any
way describe the rate to be paid and in no way modified
the rate stated in l\1r. Miller's letter of August 30,
6.

1968.

7. Although the trial court ruled that American
Express did not receive l\Ir. l\'Iiller's letter of September 4, 1968, that letter nevertheless clearly showed l\'Ir.
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l\Jiller's understanding that the rate would be charged
by weight only at the time of the transaction.
The law is clear that:
" ... an agent may not recover for losses incurred because of failure to follow the principal' s instructions, or for payments made for
the principal but without the latter's authority."

Ilullandalc lllarketing Association vs. Goernat, 72 N.,V.
2d 37G. See also Drakc-J ones Co. vs. Drogseth, 246
N.W. t164.
\ V)1en American Express. expended funds to ship
the feathers far in excess of $77 .00 per 2000 pounds
measured by weight, they exceeded the authority given
them by Utah eFathers. 'Vhether done deliberately or
by inadntance or negligence in failure to check the
extent of their authority, American Express exceeded
their authorized expenditures without seeking new instrucfons from Utah
and without Utah
Feathers' knowledge that they had done so. l\Ir. :Miller
protested the excessive charges as soon as he learned of
them. The trial court chose to ignore both the facts and
the law in that regard and in doing so committed reversable error.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
IT FAILED TO RULE THAT BE-
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CAUSE THE UTAH FEATHERS'
ANS\VER TO THE AMERICAN EXPRESS OFFER VARIED THE PROPOSED TERl\IS BY LIMITING THE
RATES TO l\IEASURE BY 'VEIGHT
ONLY, IT CONSTITUTED A REJECTION OF THAT 0 Ij-. F ER AND
THEREFORE A COUNTEROFFER
lVHEN Al\IERICAN EXPRESS PERTHE ACT OF SHIPPING
THE GOODS THAT COUNTEROFFER SET THE Lil\IIT OF THE
AGENT'S AUTHORITY.
The agency relationship between American Express and Utah I<'eathers was created by contract. The
trial court was called upon to determine the terms of
that contract from the correspondence of the parties
in order to determine how mueh American Express was
authorized to spend for transporting the feathers (Transcript page 7). All of the witnesses testified that there
was no agreement except that arrived at by the correspondence between them (Transcript pages 39, 48,
.50 and 54) . The trial court construction of that documentary evidence is not entitled to any presumption
of correctness since this court has those same documents
before it.
The initial letter l\Ir. :Miller wrote to American
Express Company on August 20, 1968 was a request
for a quote of prices for handling the shipment of
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feathers and can only he construed to he an invitation
to enter into negotiations (Defendant's Exhibit No.
20). Therefore it was l\Ir. Ewing's answering letter of
August 26, 1!)68 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11) that
constituted the first offer. In this letter American
Express offered to handle the shipments, spelled out
their fees and charges and in very ambiguous language
quoted non-conference and conference cargo rates.
It is fundamental that in order to create a contract
from that offer the letter by Utah Feathers would have
to have agreed to all of the terms set forth in the offer
without any substantial or material variance, and without qualification or departure.

'Villiston on Contracts, 3rd Ed., Section 73, describes the rule and its application as follows:

"Acceptance
Offer

ftf ust

Compllf With Terms of

In order to make a bargain it is necessary that
the acceptor shall give in return for the offeror' s promise exactly the consideration which
the of feror requests. If an act is requested,
that \'ery act and no other must be given. If
a promise is requested, that promise must be
made absolutely and unqualifiedly. This does
not mean necessarily that the precise words of
the requested promise must be repeated, but
by a positive and unqualified assent to the proposal the acceptor must in effect agree to
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make precisely the promise requested; and if
any provision is added to which the offeror
did not assent, the consequence is not merely
that this provision is not binding and that no
contract is formed, but that the of fer is rejected.
The new condition is as fatal when its inconsistency with the offer appears by implication
only as when it is explicitly stated... "
l\Ir..Miller's response to the offer proposed by
l\f r. Ewing did not consist of an unqualified acceptance of its terms. If l\Ir. Miller had said merely, ""\Ve
wish to ship our feathers via conference vessels with
terms as set forth in your letter." his acceptance would
have been unqualified. Ile did not do that. Instead his
letter spelled out his understanding of the rates in detail and in language that made it clear that he did not
intend to pay Ly volume. Viewing the rates quoted in
terms of l\Ir. Ewing's understanding, the Miller response would have to be a counteroffer thereby rejecting l\Ir. Ewing's offer and if American Express chose
to proceed without further negotiations as to rates, they
were bound to conform to the terms specified in .Mr.
Miller's letter (17 Am. Jur. 2nd, Contracts, Section
866).

The very language of the offer made by .Mr.
Ewing is ambiguous as to rates. What does he mean by
"77.00 per 40 cubic feet or two thousand pounds.

24

OCEAN FREIGIIT plus 3% of Total Freight."?
Does the reference to weight or cubic volume mean
that the shipper could elect to pay either by weight or
by volume, as testified to hy l\Ir. l\Iiller (Transcript
page 56), or does it mean, as claimed hy l\Ir. Ewing,
that it is carrier's option (Transcript pages 40 and 43)?
It is noteworthy that at the trial the judge could
see no ambiguity in the rate quoted by l\fr. Ewing and
apparently drew upon some prior experiences of his own
with surface shipping. Counsel for Utah
had
offered eYidence of the intent of the parties for clarification and Judge Sorensen stated: "Let's have that
out right now. \Vhere is the ambiguity, l\Ir. Jeffs? I
don't see any ambiguity in Exhibit 11. I don't see any
ambiguity." (Transcript page GO.)

Then when counsel for Utah Feathers pointed out
that American Express had already introduced testimony to explain their interpretation of the meaning of
the rate quote per "forty cubic feet or two thousand
pounds," in that letter Judge Sorensen said:
"You are claiming this as an ambiguity? To
me it is not. I have had a little experience with
surface shipping. It was when you were a little
lad in rompers. It may have been an ambiguity
to this man. Go ahead. You may develop that.
Go ahead."
(Transcript page 61).
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In any event, after all testimony was in, the trial
court had before it two possibilities in regard to the
language of .Mr. Ewing's letter of August 26, 1962
quoting the rate. It could have meant that Utah Feathers could choose whether to pay by volume or by weight.
If that is the proper construction, then l\1r. Miller's
response constituted an election to ship by weight and
American Express had no authority to pay other than
by weight. On the other hand, the court could determine
that the quoted language by inference meant that the
carrier had the option to charge by weight or by volume, which ever was to its advantage. In that event,
Mr. l\Iiller's answering letter setting forth in detail
that the rates he wished to pay "per 2000 pounds" being by volume only constituted a rejection of the proposed terms and a counteroffer.
l\Ir. l\liller didn't take any chances on what l\fr.
Ewing meant when he wrote his response. Instead his
was
answer spelled out exactly what Utah
wi1ling to pay so l\Ir. Ewing would have no question of
the limits of his authority. His letter made no reference to cubic feet, and stated:
"We wish to sign an agreement to ship all our
feathers via Conference vessels in the $77.00
per 2,000 pound rate ... "
,,Vhen l\fr. Ewing read this response he could have
had no question in his mind that l\'Ir. l\Iiller did not inten<l. to pay by cubic volume and that American Express
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was not authorized to pay cargo rates in excess of $77.00
per 2,000 pounds plus the handling, wharfage and
American Express charges.
" ... Under the rule that an agent is bound to
exercise such diligence as persons of common
prudence are accustomed to use about their
own affairs, the law creates no promise on the
part of the principal to pay expenses which the
agent, although acting in good faith, might
have a 'raided by the exercise of ordinary diligence. For example, where the circumstances
are such that because of an obvious mistake
on the part of the principal a prudent person
would not have made an advance of money to
a third person, an agent who makes the advance
is negligent, and cannot recover therefor... "
( 3 C' orpus Juris Secundum, Agency, Section 198C) .
If l\Ir. Ewing, as he stated, understood his letter
giving the quoted rates to imply that the caITier had the
option to charge by either weight or volume, whichever
was to its advantage, then he had a duty when he received l\Ir. l\1iller's response omitting any reference to
a rate per volume to advise .l\Ir. :Miller of the meaning
he intended in his previous quote. None of his communications did so. American Express was supposed to be
the expert with skill in the field of arranging transportion and working out rates, and it was in the very least,
gross negligence for them to proceed to expend funds
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to ship the goods in amounts far in excess of the rate
authorized by l\fr. Miller's letter.
Even if l\Ir. Ewing's action in paying freight
charges beyond those authorized by .l\lr. Miller were
merely a mistake by American Express, they cannot
avoid responsibility on that ground since a unilateral
mistake will not avoid the contract ( 17 Am. J ur. 2nd,
Contracts, Section 146), and of course does not relieve
the agent of its responsibilities to its principal.
It would be unconscionable to allow American Express to carelessly and recklessly ignore the language
in l\Ir. l\iiller's response to their offer and then hold
Utah }-.eathers responsible. The trial court committed
error in doing so.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COl\IlVflTTED
ERROR IN BASING ITS DECISION
UPON A DETERlVIINATION THAT
UTAH
'VAS CHARGEABLE 'VITH KNO,VLEDGE THAT
THE RATES QUOTED BY AMERICAN EXPRESS WERE l\IADE WITHIN THE CUSTOM AND USAGE OF
THE BUSINESS.
In the findings, the trial court ruled:
"That the plaintiff's (American Express)
quotes to the defendant (Utah Feathers) were
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made within the custom and usage of the business, and the defendant principal is chargeable with such knowledge."
This appears to have been a basis of the trial court's
decision. In the l\Iemorandum Decision the court cited
as authority the Restatement, Agency, 2nd Ed., Section
10, which reads as follows:
"Knowledge \\rhich Principal or Agent Should
I-lave Inter Se

Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, a
principal or agent, with respect to the other,
shoHld know what a person of ordinary experience and intelligence would know, and in
addition, what he would know if, having the
knowledge and intelligence which he has or
which he purports to have, he were to use due
care m the performance of his duties to the
other." (Emphasis added).
Under this rule of law, l\Ir. Miller, acting for Utah
Feathers, was not required to know more than a person
of ordinary experience and intelligence would know.
Ordinary experience would not have told him that :Mr.
Ewing's quote of rates would allow the carrier the option of how to charge the rate. l\Ioreover, the rule as
stated in the Restatement, expressly excludes its application where parties have otherwise agreed. When the
l\Iiller letter responded with terms contrary to :Mr.
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Ewing's understanding of the terms he set forth in his
earlier letter, the law infers an assent or agreement to
the terms of the l\Iiller letter when American Express
proceds to do the act requested without seeking any
modification of :Miller's instructions as to rate.
It should be pointed out that while Section 10 of
the Restatement concerns itself with the standard of
knowledge and experience as between the principal
and agent, holding them each only to that of a person
of ordinary experience and intelligence, it is Section
36 of the Restatement that relates to custom and usage.

"Usage in Interpretation of Authority
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is authorized to comply with relevant usage of business
if the principal has notice that usages of such
a nature may exist." (Emphasis added)
Restatement, Agency, 2nd Ed., Section 30.
l\lr. Ewing stated that usage of the business construed a rate quote such as he used to mean the carrier
had the option to charge the rate either by weight or by
volume. But there was absolutely no evidence tending
to show Utah Feathers or
..Miller had any notice
testified that in his
of such a usage. In fact, Mr.
experience tmless the quoted rate specified otherwise,
the shipper could choose to have the rate applied either
to weight or to volume at its election (Transcript pages
56, 61, 52 and 63). In either case, "usage is not effec-
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tive to contradict the specific terms of an authorization .... " (Restatement, Agency, 2nd Ed., Section 36,
Comment b).
As stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, Agency, 3, under the
heading, "Obedience to Instructions and Directions,"
Section 206:
"\\There the instructions are clear, precise and
imperative, they should be followed strictly
and exactly, and a violation of definite instructions cannot be excused by a custom or usage
in the business."
Even if the trial court were right that Utah FeathEwing's
ers is chargeable with knowledge that
quote impliedly meant that the rate could be applied by
the carrier either to weight or volume, that is not to say
that Utah Feathers could not, by its own instructions,
limit the authority of their agent in the amount author·
ized to be spent for freight by designating that they
wanted to pay only $77.00 per 2000 pounds.
Freight rates are a complex matter with variations
in the rates as they are applied to different commodities, variations in rates based upon routes taken, variations resulting from modes of transportation and varia·
tions resulting from many other factors ..l\1r. :Miller
testified that Utah Feathers had previously shipped
feathers to European ports from Port of New York
for a total of $132.60 per mertic ton (2260 lbs.). Fur·
thermore, he was looking for a better way to ship his
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feathers. The quote from .l\Ir. Ewing for non-conference vessels totaled $123.00 per 2000 pounds ( computed $n0.58 plus $2.72, being 3% of total freight; $4.20
handling fees; $1.00 wharfage fee; $2.50 banking; and
documentation), and was close to what Utah
Feathers had paid in the past, since the former rate was
per metric ton, and Mr. E\ving's quote was per 2000
pounds. V\Then :Mr. Ewing's letter suggested that if
Utah :Feathers were willing to agree to use only conference vessels, the conference rate would be a savings,
Mr. l\Iiller, by computation, obviously arrived at the
conclusion that the total for conference rates and
: charges of $107.01 per 2000 pounds would be a savings over the rate he had been paying of $132.60 per
metric ton.
1

The real question for determination by the trial
court was not so much the meaning of .Mr. Ewing's
rate quote in the light of custom and usage, but rather,
the authority granted by the answering letter of l\'Ir.
Miller. The language of that answering letter is une11uivocal as to the rate and needs no help from custom
or usage to clarify its meaniug. l\Ir. l\Iiller's letter was
unequivocal as to the extent of authority of American
Express as to rates. Amrican Express could, within
their authority, only pay $77.00 per 2000 pounds, plus
the other charges he itemized for the shipment, which
totaled $107.01 per 2000 pounds. The extent of the
authority of American Express was therefore limited
to the sum of $1,534.35 as testified by Mr. Miller and
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shown by weight on the invoices. It was error to grant
judgment for any sum in excess of that amount.
CONCLUSION
On the record as it stands there can be no question
that American Express acted as agent for Utah Feathers in the transactions and owed the utmost degree of
good faith and care in the affairs of their principal.
American Express held itself out as having special
skills in arrainging rates and the other complexities of
processing shipments of goods in international freight.
There is no question that Utah Feathers intended to pay
the freight rate on the basis of weight only, and that
this fact·was communicated in writing to American Express. As between the parties, it was American Express
that failed to maintain the standard of care owed to
its principal. The Utah Feathers communications gave
no authority to American Express to pay freight rates
computed on the basis of volume. We submit that the
agent ought not now be permitted to recoup from their
principal the loss created by their own failure to stay
within the authority they were given.
RESPECTFULY SUBl\:IITTED this 14th day
of July, 1972.
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